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I. INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
Prior to the establishment of the tax benefit rule, if a taxpayer
erroneously deducted an item of expense, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) could assess a tax deficiency for the error year, pro-
vided the statute of limitations1 had not run. If, however, the facts
existing at the time of the deduction justified the taxpayer's belief
that the deduction was proper, the IRS subsequently could not
disallow the deduction, even if the statute of limitations had not
run.2 In Excelsior Printing Co. v. Commissioner' the tax court re-
placed that standard with the first version of the tax benefit rule.
That version of the rule generally required income recognition in
the year of repayment or recovery of an item previously charged to
expense by a taxpayer. Although the courts gradually applied the
rule in an increasing variety of factual settings, their explanations
of the rationale for these applications varied substantially from
case to case.4
1. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1982) (requiring that the IRS assess any additional tax within
three years after the date on which the taxpayer originally filed the tax return).
2. Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. Rav. 265, 266 (1978).
3. 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929). In Excelsior, an accrual method taxpayer had recognized in-
come upon establishment of an account receivable from a debtor. When the debtor filed a
petition in bankruptcy, the taxpayer charged to expense a portion of the receivable as a bad
debt reserve. Upon the taxpayer's subsequent collection in full of the receivable, the tax
court required the taxpayer to recognize income equal to the amount of that repayment in
the taxable year of receipt. Id. at 888.
4. Some courts reasoned that the deduction of a bad debt reserve converted the uncol-
lectible principal amount from a capital item into an ordinary income item. Accordingly,
these courts found that the conversion subjected the eventual repayment to ordinary income
taxation. See, e.g., Commissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir. 1948);
National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 875, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1940). Other
courts adopted an accounting approach and required a "balancing entry" in the recovery
year to offset the prior erroneous deduction. See, e.g., Barnett v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A.
864, 867 (1939); South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1430-
32 (1932). Finally, a few courts interpreted the prior deduction as the implied consent of the
taxpayer to taxation of any future repayment as ordinary income. See, e.g., Electric Storage
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When courts later began to acknowledge that the taxation of a
repayment resulted from the prior deduction, taxpayers naturally
insisted upon nonrecognition of the recovery if the prior deduction
had produced no decrease in the taxes that they actually were re-
quired to pay (for example, when a taxpayer had experienced a net
operating loss in the deduction year). In 1942, Congress officially
endorsed this taxpayer contention by enacting the statutory prede-
cessor of present section 111.1 Read literally, the current section
111 provides only the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit
rule-requiring a taxpayer to exclude from income the portion of
previously expensed items he recovered for which he received no
prior tax benefit. As applied, however, section 111 also encom-
passes an inclusionary component, which requires the inclusion in
income of previously deducted items that a taxpayer recovers, if
the prior deductions reduced the actual tax payments of that
taxpayer.6
This inclusionary component of the tax benefit rule functions
as a necessary "counterweight" to the consequences of the need to
assess and collect taxes at regular intervals. The annual tax assess-
ment and collection system requires that taxpayers treat taxable
events as final at the end of each taxable year, even though subse-
quent occurrences may reveal the propriety of a different tax treat-
ment for those events. That annual cutoff may provide the tax-
payer with an opportunity to exploit his actual tax posture and the
present tax system by deducting items whose tax status he knows
will change in the future. By design, the inclusionary component of
Battery Co. v. Rothensies, 57 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1944), af'd, 152 F.2d 521 (3d Cir.
1945), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 296 (1946); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies,
43 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
5. All section references indicate provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (the
Code). The present § 111 provides as follows: "Gross income does not include income attrib-
utable to the recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency
amount, to the extent of the amount of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt,
tax, or amount." I.R.C. § 111(a) (1982). The section further explains that "recovery exclu-
sion" means "the amount . . . of the deductions . . ., which did not result in a reduction of
the taxpayer's tax . . ., reduced by the amount excludable in previous taxable years with
respect to such debt, tax, or amount . . . ." Id. § 111(b)(4).
The regulations expand the scope of § 111(a) by providing that "[t]he rule of exclusion
. . . applies equally with respect to all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made the
basis of deductions from gross income from prior taxable years .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.111-
1(a) (1956).
6. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 2, at 271; see also Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978) (referring to its inclusionary aspect), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401-02
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (concentrating on the exclusionary component of the tax benefit rule).
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the tax benefit rule removes the opportunity for such exploitation.7
The application of the tax benefit rule's inclusionary aspect in such
situations, however, presumes that the same taxpayer who received
the benefit of the prior deduction also received the subsequent re-
covery. Section 111, therefore, generally requires that the original
taxpayer's successor include a recovery in income even when the
original taxpayer could have excluded that recovery. Similarly, the
inclusionary component of the tax benefit rule should not result in
income to the originally deducting taxpayer if a taxpayer other
than the taxpayer who benefited from the prior deduction realizes
the recovery.'
In light of the recent Supreme Court holding in United States
v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.10 that the tax benefit rule requires income rec-
ognition by a corporation when it distributes previously expensed
assets in complete liquidation, this Note assesses the dubious con-
tinued vitality of the tax benefit rule's single taxpayer con-
struct-that is, the requirement that the same individual or entity
serve as both the deducting and the recovering taxpayer. As the
following analysis indicates, expansion of the tax benefit rule into a
multiple taxpayer construct potentially requires some form of "re-
capture" in numerous factual settings previously considered non-
taxable under existing nonrecognition provisions. In response to
the unpredictability of the Bliss 'Dairy analysis in any given non-
recognition context and the pervasive recapture implications of ei-
ther a liberal or literal interpretation of the Bliss Dairy holding,
this Note suggests an alternative basis for decision under the Bliss
Dairy facts. This alternative requires the use of section 446(b), 11
which would allow the IRS to achieve the Bliss Dairy result with-
out causing any distortion of the tax benefit rule's traditional
7. Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring).
8. In most contexts, the exclusionary aspect of § 111 does not extend to the subse-
quent recovery by a taxpayer other than the originally deducting taxpayer-for example,
when an S corporation recovers an amount previously passed through to and deducted by its
shareholders. See, e.g., Ridge Realization Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 508, 523 (1966)
(deciding the issue of the taxability of such a recovery on an assignment of claim theory,
rather than a tax benefit rule theory). Section 381(c)(12) provides exceptions to this limita-
tion upon the exclusionary rule in the case of certain corporate liquidations and reorganiza-
tions. These exceptions, however, extend only to acquisitions of one corporation's assets by
another corporation, and even then only to certain types of distributions and transfers of
those assets. See I.R.C. § 381(a) (1982).
9. See Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1963).
10. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
11. See infra note 59.
1354 [Vol. 37:1351
TAX BENEFIT RULE
scope, applicability, or function. This Note also recommends legis-
lation that would define the exact scope of various nonrecognition
provisions and that would provide, in the case of "tax benefit rule
income" falling outside the scope of those provisions, a recognition
scheme that enhances both the policy considerations behind the
applicable nonrecognition provision and the corrective goals im-
plicit in section 111.
II. BACKGROUND: APPLICATIONS OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE PRIOR
TO Bliss Dairy
The cases that illustrate the applications of and limitations
upon the tax benefit rule generally fall into one of two categories:
first, those cases in which the same individual or entity serves as
both the deducting and the recovering taxpayer (the single tax-
payer construct cases); and second, those cases in which different
individuals or entities serve as the deducting and the recovering
taxpayers (the multiple taxpayer construct cases). First, this part
of the Note explains the application of the tax benefit rule to
transfers of property under section 351,12 contributions of capital
under section 118,'3 and distributions of assets in liquidation under
section 337.14 Each of these presumably nonrecognition transac-
tions falls within the single taxpayer construct as described above.
Second, this part describes the application of the tax benefit rule
to the multiple taxpayer construct cases. These latter cases con-
cern distributions of assets in liquidation under section 336,15 inter
vivos gifts of previously expensed assets, 16 and transfers by bequest
at death of previously expensed assets. 17
A. Single Taxpayer Construct Applications
In the single taxpayer construct cases, the application of the
tax benefit rule hinges upon the existence of a "recovery"'' and the
strength of the policy considerations supporting the relevant non-
12. See infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
18. The emphasis on an actual, physical recovery follows naturally from the regula-
tions under § 111. Those regulations explain that recoveries result from the "receipt of
amounts in respect of the previously deducted ... items, such as from the collection or sale
of a bad debt, refund or credit of taxes paid, or cancellation of taxes accrued." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.111-1(a)(2) (1956).
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recognition provision. Having located a recovery and having nar-
rowed the scope of the relevant nonrecognition rule, the courts
generally invoke the tax benefit rule in section 351 and section 337
settings. Notwithstanding the existence of a recovery, however, the
courts, prior to 1980, generally rejected the tax benefit rule in sec-
tion 118 contexts because of the overpowering policy considera-
tions underlying that nonrecognition provision.
1. Applications of Section 111 to Section 351 Exchanges
In section 35119 transactions, tax benefit rule issues arise most
often in relation to transfers of accounts receivable, net of bad
debt reserves, by an accrual method taxpayer during incorporation
of a previously existing proprietorship. 0 In Nash v. United
States,2 for example, a partnership in which the taxpayer partici-
pated as a partner incorporated its finance businesses into eight
separate corporations pursuant to section 351. The accrual basis
22
and reserve method2 3 partnership transferred its accounts receiv-
able, net of a substantial bad debt reserve, to the corporations. The
Government argued that the transferor-taxpayer should have rec-
ognized ordinary income upon the incorporation of the partnership
in an amount equal to the reserve balance existing at the time of
the transfer. 24 The taxpayer relied upon the nonrecognition lan-
19. Section 351(a) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is trans-
ferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in
such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control
. . . of the corporation." I.R.C. § 351(a) (1982).
20. The rationale underlying the tax benefit rule, however, could apply to any item
that the taxpayer deducted prior to transferring that item to a corporation in a § 351
setting.
21. 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
22. An accrual basis taxpayer recognizes items of income and expense when he earns
or incurs them, rather than when he actually receives or pays them. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1(c)(1)(ii) (1957).
23. Under the reserve method of accounting for bad debts, the taxpayer annually ex-
penses and deducts a reasonable addition to a reserve for uncollectible accounts receivable,
rather than directly expensing individual accounts receivable as they become uncollectible.
See generally I.R.C. § 166(c) (1982). As the accounts receivable actually prove to be uncol-
lectible, the taxpayer writes them off by reducing the reserve balance by the amount of the
uncollectible accounts, and by similarly reducing the amount of the gross acounts receivable.
No additional deduction is available to the taxpayer at the time of these write-off proce-
dures. See H. SELLIN, ATTORNEYS' PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO AccouNTING 9-7 (1965).
24. The taxpayer, through a preincorporation partnership, deducted the amount of the
reserve and accordingly reduced his personal tax liability for years prior to the § 351 ex-
change. According to the Government, these facts required income recognition in an amount
equal to the reserve notwithstanding the nonrecognition provisions of § 351 and notwith-
standing the fact that the corporation booked the accounts receivable at net value. Because
1356
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guage of section 351. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit required the taxpayer to include an amount equal to
the reserve in income, reasoning that section 351 allowed each
transferor to postpone gain or loss recognition until that transferor
actually realized such gains or losses.2 5 The court of appeals de-
cided that the transferor had realized no gain or loss as a result of
the transfer of accounts receivable at net value.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted a contrasting view in Estate of Schmidt v. Commis-
sioner,26 the facts of which were very similar to those in Nash v.
United States. In Estate of Schmidt the court concentrated upon
the recovery requirement of the tax benefit rule and emphasized
that the transferor-taxpayer in no economic sense had "recovered"
the value of the reserve. Regardless of whether the taxpayer trans-
ferred the reserve, he received in stock only the value of the net
receivable. The court, therefore, required no income recognition
because the consideration the taxpayer received did not exceed the
net receivable.
In order to resolve this split between the Fifth and the Ninth
Circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Nash v. United States. The
Court reversed the Nash holding and adopted the Ninth Circuit's
approach. The Court reasoned that transferring the receivable at
net value reflected the economic reality of the transaction in Nash
because the transferee assumed all risks of noncollection. Because
the value of the stock received as a result of the section 351 ex-
change equalled the net value of the accounts receivable, the Court
decided that no "recovery" occurred within the meaning of section
111 and that the exchange therefore required no income adjust-
the need for the reserve ceased upon partnership termination, the Government relied upon
this "end of need" to support its proposed adjustment to income. 414 F.2d at 630.
25. According to the court, exclusion of the reserve from the transferor's income was
comparable to the recognition, but not the realization, of a loss upon the transfer of the
receivables at net value-a result obviously at odds with the court's finding that § 351 pre-
cluded the recognition of unrealized gains and losses from changes in asset market values.
Id.
26. 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966). In Estate of Schmidt, the taxpayer operated an ac-
crual basis and reserve method proprietorship. See supra notes 22 & 23. Pursuant to § 351,
the taxpayer transferred all the proprietorship's assets and liabilities to a corporation, whol-
ly owned by the taxpayer, in exchange for stock equal to the net worth of the proprietor-
ship. The transferred assets included accounts receivable against which the taxpayer had
applied a substantial bad debt reserve. 355 F.2d at 111-12.
27. 355 F.2d at 114.
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ment.28 In essence, the Court applied the section 111 recovery re-
quirement to avoid the issue of whether the tax benefit rule over-
rode section 351 nonrecognition provisions. The Court merely held
that even if the tax benefit rule did override section 351, the lack
of a recovery precluded income recognition under section 111. Per-
haps the Court intended to establish as a universal rule that the
mere involvement of a section 351 exchange preempts application
of the tax benefit rule.29 On the other hand, the Court could have
intended merely that no income had resulted from the exchange of
accounts receivable for stock equal in value to the net receivable.
The Court's endorsement of the holding in Estate of Schmidt v.
Commissioner ° suggests that the Court intended the latter inter-
pretation. 1 Regardless of the uncertainty remaining after Nash
concerning whether section 111 overrides section 351,3 the Nash
Court unequivocally supported the actual recovery requirement
described in the regulations under section 111.
33
2. Applications of Section 111 to Section 118 Contributions of
Capital
In section 11811 cases prior to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980,35 the courts generally ignored the existence of a recovery and
.based their rejection of the tax benefit rule upon the absolute na-
28. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1970). In short, the Court held that the
"end of need" for the reserve failed to qualify as a "recovery" under the tax benefit rule and
that the rule did not extend to § 351 exchanges in which the stock the taxpayer received
equalled the value of the net receivable the taxpayer transferred to the corporation. Id.
29. O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the
Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAx L. Rav. 215,
220-21 (1972) (suggesting that such an interpretation explains the Court's quotation of the
§ 351 nonrecognition provision within the text of the opinion because if the Court had held
simply that no recovery occurred, it should have said that no gain or loss was realized).
30. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
31. O'Hare, supra note 29, at 220. This interpretation of Nash gains additional sup-
port from subsequent circuit court holdings. See, e.g., Citizens' Acceptance Corp. v. United
States, 462 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972) (requiring gain recognition under the tax benefit rule
when a corporation, upon the sale of net accounts receivable pursuant to a § 337 liquidation,
realized an amount in excess of the net book value of the receivables).
32. Technically, § 111 includes only the exclusionary component of the tax benefit
rule. As a result, the general principle of the tax benefit rule, and not ] 111] itself, overrides
a nonrecognition provision. Because the Nash Court, however, equated § 111 with both com-
ponents of the rule, it found that § 111 itself can override a nonrecognition provision.
33. See supra note 18.
34. This section provides: "In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include
any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer." I.R.C. § 118(a) (1982).
35. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108 and scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)).
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ture of section 118 itself.3 6 Hartland Associates v. Commissioner"
illustrates the status of the law prior to 1980. In Hartland Associ-
ates a corporation's sole shareholder forgave approximately
$18,000 of accrued interest that his corporation owed him. Appar-
ently relying upon Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp.,3 8 the Commis-
sioner argued that the nongratuitous nature of this discharge re-
quired income recognition by the corporation under the tax benefit
rule. The tax court, however, viewed the debt forgiveness as a gra-
tuitous cancellation and decided that it was a contribution of capi-
tal rather than taxable income to the corporation. The court found
insignificant the fact that the corporation previously had deducted
the "forgiven" interest. To the contrary, the court summarily con-
cluded that section 118 would "not be overridden by the abstract
notion of tax benefit.
'39
Similarly, in Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner,40 the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals examined a shareholder's uncompensated
cancellation of approximately $25,000 in accrued interest that his
corporation owed him. Because the corporation previously had de-
ducted the interest, the Commissioner contended that the cancel-
lation produced taxable income to the corporation under the tax
benefit rule. The court, however, viewed section 118 as a congres-
sionally mandated exception to the tax benefit rule. According to
the court, the judicially created tax benefit rule could not super-
sede statutory exceptions to income recognition.4 1 By blending the
provisions of two nonrecognition sections into its analysis, the
court concluded that the shareholder had "made a gift to the [cor-
poration] within the meaning of [s]ection 102 by contributing to
[its] capital within the meaning of [s]ection 118" when he can-
36. Therefore, if a shareholder gratuitously forgave a salary obligation that his accrual
basis corporation owed to him, then the transaction constituted "a contribution to the capi-
tal of the corporation to the extent of the principal of the debt." Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a)
(1957). Both the general rule of § 118(a) and the regulations under § 61 prescribed this
result. See id.
37. 54 T.C. 1580 (1970).
38. 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940). The courts uniformly had rejected the imposition of
tax liability under a tax benefit theory in cases of gratuitous debt cancellation. See, e.g.,
Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 331 (1943); Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322,
326 (8th Cir. 1951). A few courts, however, applied the tax benefit theory in determining the
effect of a nongratuitous cancellation of debt items previously deducted by the debtor, such
as the interest component of the obligation. See Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d
at 942-43.
39. Hartland Assocs. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 1586.
40. 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 742, 751.
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celled the interest.42 The Fifth Circuit held, therefore, that the
mere relevance of the nonrecognition provisions of section 102 and
section 118 precluded any application of the tax benefit rule.43
In the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 (the Act),44 Congress re-
acted to these judicial determinations that section 118 overrides
the tax benefit rule by creating a new contribution-to-capital rule
that specifically reversed the result in Putoma Corp.45 The Act
provides that the discharge of indebtedness rules of section 10848
apply when a cash basis41 shareholder-creditor contributes (or for-
gives) a debt, representing an accrued expense previously deducted
by the corporation-debtor, to the capital of the accrual basis corpo-
ration.48 In the case of a solvent corporation not in bankruptcy, the
Act allows the corporation to choose between reducing its basis in
depreciable assets by the amount of the discharge, or recognizing
income equal to the amount of the discharge in the taxable year in
which the discharge occurred. If, however, the taxpayer-share-
holder uses the accrual method and includes the cancelled debt in
his personal income prior to the cancellation, no discharge amount
exists and no attribute reduction results to his corporation.49 In
42. Id. at 751. Section 102 provides as follows: "Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982).
43. The court's analysis, blending § 102 and § 118, required satisfaction of the dona-
tive intent requirement as established by Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322
(1943). In American Dental Co., a corporation's creditors partially or wholly forgave delin-
quent rent and interest the corporation owed them. The United States Supreme Court de-
cided that a "gratuitous" release of an obligation by the creditor, without consideration in
return, was a gift within the meaning of § 22(b)(3) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.
Section 22(b)(3), the statutory predecessor of present § 102, embodied substantially the
same provisions as the current section. See supra note 42. Relying upon American Dental
Co., the court in Putoma Corp. determined that the nontaxable gift status of the debt can-
cellation required that the shareholder-creditor possess donative intent. 601 F.2d at 747.
The court ultimately held that the facts of Putoma satisfied the donative intent require-
ment. Id. at 751.
44. See supra note 35.
45. See S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 n.22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7017, 7034 n.22 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1035].
46. See I.R.C. § 108 (1982) for a statement of the discharge of indebtedness rules as
amended.
47. A cash basis taxpayer recognizes items of income and expense when actually re-
ceived or paid, rather than when earned or incurred. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i)
(1957).
48. See S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 45, at 7034.
49. Id. at 7033 n.21. The Act further specifies that the § 102 analysis used in Putoma
Corp. does not apply in the debt discharge area. According to Congress, the general rule
that a corporation realizes income upon the discharge of indebtedness contemplates no gift
exceptions in commercial contexts. Id. at 7034 n.22.
The Act, however, does limit the application of the new contribution-to-capital rules to
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sum, although Congress clearly determined that section 118 does
not control the tax treatment of the debt cancellation amount in a
Putoma Corp. scenario, it chose to rely upon a debt discharge the-
ory of income realization, as opposed to a tax benefit theory, and
to structure the recognition requirements consistently with the re-
medial purposes of the Act.
50
3. Applications of Section 111 to Section 337 Liquidations
To avoid the pre-1980 section 118 problem-the failure of the
courts to tax under section 111 the recovery of a prior deduc-
tion-in another nonrecognition context, the courts have held, con-
sistently and without objection from Congress, that the tax benefit
rule overrides the nonrecognition provision of section 337.51 For ex-
ample, in Commissioner v. Anders,52 the taxpayer, Service Indus-
trial Cleaners, Inc. (Industrial), executed a written agreement for
the transfer of all its assets to a group of individuals who pur-
chased Industrial's business on behalf of a new corporation also
named Service Industrial Cleaners, Inc. (Service). Prior to consum-
mation of the sale, Industrial adopted a plan of complete liquida-
tion pursuant to section 337. Industrial claimed nonrecognition
treatment for a gain of approximately $446,000 from the sale of its
assets. This gain included approximately $233,000 that Industrial
received from the sale of rental items that carried a zero basis be-
cause Industrial had deducted their cost upon purchase.53 Accord-
ing to the Government, this $233,000 "gain" required ordinary in-
come treatment because the tax benefit rule provided an exception
to section 337 nonrecognition.4 Additionally, the Government in-
cases in which the shareholder's cancellation of the debt relates to his status as a share-
holder. For example, if the shareholder-creditor acts as a creditor attempting to maximize
the satisfaction of his claim, the new provisions of the Act do not apply. Id.
50. By the Act's amendments to previous law, Congress intended to permit the debtor
to account for debt discharges in "the manner most favorable to the debtor's [own] tax
situation." Id. at 7025.
51. This section provides: "If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on
which a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corpora-
tion are distributed in complete liquidation. . ., then no gain or loss shall be recognized to
such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period."
I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982).
52. 48 T.C. 815 (1967), rev'd, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958
(1969).
53. Industrial provided a rental service for laundered towels, dusting materials, and
apparel. Because of the 12 to 18 month useful life of these rental items, Industrial expensed
and deducted their cost upon purchase. No party to the litigation disputed the propriety of
these prior deductions. 414 F.2d at 1285.
54. The Government insisted that § 337 nonrecognition carried the same exceptions
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sisted that if no gain resulted from appreciation in asset value,
then no basis existed for the extension of nonrecognition under
section 337. In opposition, the taxpayer argued that its sale of
these rental assets constituted a sale of "property" within the
broad meaning of section 337(a) and without the specific exclusion
of section 337(b)(1), and therefore, qualified for complete nonrec-
ognition. Because the tax court viewed the tax benefit rule as
clearly frustrating the purpose of section 337, the court refused to
apply the rule under the Anders facts.
55
Reversing the tax court's decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that if the tax benefit rule ap-
plied to the sale of rental assets outside of section 337, then it also
applied to the sale of such items in a section 337 liquidation. The
court emphasized that section 337 contained no provision barring
the application of section 111 and, therefore, that the tax benefit
rule applied, requiring Industrial to recognize income in the
that apply to capital gain treatment under the Code. Nonrecognition under § 337(a) extends
only to exchanges of "property." See supra note 51. Likewise, § 1201(a) and § 1222 extend
preferential capital gain treatment only to the sale of a "capital asset." See I.R.C.
§§ 1201(a), 1222 (1982). The Code defines a "capital asset" to exclude "stock in trade...
or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the tax-
payer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." Id. § 1221(1). Section
337(b) uses virtually identical language to define "property" for purposes of § 337(a). See
id. § 337(b)(1)(A). Because § 1201, § 1221, and § 1222 exclude inventory from capital gain
treatment, the Government contended that the Code excludes the same types of assets for
purposes of § 337(a). Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d at 1285-86. The Government argued
further that, because sales of inventory produce ordinary income under § 1201, § 1221, and
§ 1222, they also produce ordinary income under § 111 and § 337.
55. The tax court determined that the corporation's gain resulted from the sale of all
its assets pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation and, therefore, the gain qualified for
nonrecognition under § 337, notwithstanding that the gain also represented a recovery of
expenses the corporation previously had deducted. Referring to the legislative history and
judicial development of § 337, the tax court emphasized that Congress intended that section
to "permit a liquidating corporation to make a tax-free sale of all its assets with but a single
tax being imposed at the stockholder level without regard to the form of the transaction."
Anders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. at 821. Because the tax court felt that the tax benefit rule
clearly frustrated the purpose of § 337 under the facts of Anders, the court refused to apply
the rule. Id. at 823.
The tax court distinguished a number of cases in which courts required taxpayers in
analogous situations to recognize income under the assignment of income doctrine. That
doctrine provides generally that a taxpayer may not avoid taxation by assigning the income
that is the object of the taxation. See Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d
837, 844 (9th Cir. 1963) (Carter, J., dissenting). See generally Lyon & Eustice, Assignment
of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295 (1962).
According to the tax court, the Anders facts failed to support an application of the assign-
ment of income theory because Industrial transferred the assets themselves rather than an
amount of income it had derived from those assets. 48 T.C. at 822-23.
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amount of $233,000.6 In classifying the character and the content
of the tax benefit rule income, the court explained that because
Industrial had deducted the full cost of the rental items, the pro-
ceeds it realized in excess of its zero basis could not represent a
gain from appreciation in asset value. Under the principles of the
tax benefit rule, which the court deemed applicable to the Anders
facts, the proceeds attributable to the rental items merited treat-
ment as a "recoupment of the expense charges. '57 In essence, the
court reasoned that the classification of assets as section 337(b)
''property" necessarily did not require categorization of the sale's
proceeds attributable to those assets as "gain" from a section 337
exchange .5  The court concluded, therefore, that because Industrial
had realized no appreciation in asset value, the transaction fell
outside the nonrecognition provisions of section 337.
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion under similar
facts in Spitalny v. United States.9 In Spitalny the court rejected
56. The court noted that Congress intended § 337 to solve the problem of taxation of
both the liquidating corporation and its shareholders upon liquidation. In Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), a corporation distributed its assets to its sharehold-
ers, who in turn transferred title to those assets to the ultimate purchaser. The Court im-
puted the shareholders' sale to the corporation and required the corporation to recognize
gain on that sale and the shareholders to recognize gain on the liquidation. In contrast, in
United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), the Court acknowledged a
bona fide liquidation and subsequent sale of the distributed assets by the shareholders. As a
result, the corporation in Cumberland avoided tax on the sale and only the shareholders
recognized gain on the liquidation. In an effort to equalize the tax result in Court Holding
and Cumberland, Congress provided for nonrecognition by the corporation on the sale of
property before liquidation, but only if pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation. 414 F.2d
at 1287. See Note, The Application of the Tax Benefit Rule to Corporate Distributions of
Expensed Assets Under LR.C. Section 336, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 700, 704-05 (1979).
57. 414 F.2d at 1288.
58. The taxpayer argued that the prior deduction of the cost of the rental items con-
stituted depreciation to which the recapture rules did not extend. But cf. I.R.C. § 1245(b)
(1982) (omitting § 337 from the list of tax free exchanges partially excluded from the gen-
eral recapture rules). Under the taxpayer's analysis, the entire proceeds in excess of the
taxpayer's zero adjusted basis would produce gain within the § 337 nonrecognition provi-
sion. In rejecting this argument, the court distinguished Industrial's deduction in the instant
case from a depreciation deduction, which reflects the gradual expiration of the useful life of
an asset. 414 F.2d at 1288.
59. 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970). In Spitalny the All-State Cattle Feeding Company
(All-State) conducted a cattle feeding operation. Pursuant to Regulation 1.162-12, All-State
elected not to account for inventories, but rather to deduct the cost of feed purchased dur-
ing each tax year. Over a seven month period, All-State purchased and expensed for tax
purposes feed costing approximately $608,000, which it subsequently sold for $177,000 pur-
suant to a § 337 liquidation. Because the prior deduction gave the corporation a zero basis
in the feed, All-State treated all of the sale's proceeds as nonrecognition gain under § 337.
Claiming that both the deduction and the sale occurred in the same taxable year, the Com-
missioner increased All-State's gross income by $177,000 to prevent distortion of income
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the taxpayer's argument that the cattle feed was "property" within
the meaning of that section and that application of the tax benefit
rule would deny nonrecognition treatment contrary to the express
provisions of the Code. The court instead held that the crucial
question was whether the corporation had realized "gain" at all.
The corporation's zero basis in the feed did not result from an ad-
justment of the asset basis to market value. To the contrary, it
resulted from a fictional conversion of that property into a con-
sumed item of expense. According to the court, therefore, the tax
benefit rule restored to the feed its true basis as property, and de-
nied the benefit of a zero basis-a basis fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the existence of the property and also inconsistent with
the transfer of the property for value. In short, the court decided
that the sale proceeds did not constitute a nonrecognizable section
337 gain, but rather resembled the recoupment of a prior
expense.6 0
As the above-mentioned cases illustrate, the courts have re-
solved the potential conflicts between sections 111 and 337 rela-
tively easily in comparison with the uncertain resolution of the po-
tential conflicts between section 111 and sections 351 and 118. In
section 351 cases, the courts apply section 111 over the nonrecogni-
tion provision because there exists an identifiable recovery and be-
cause the Supreme Court implied in Nash v. United States that
section 111 should override section 351 when an identifiable recov-
ery exists.6 1 In section 118 cases, despite the existence of a recov-
ery, the courts refused to apply section 111 over the section 118
nonrecognition provisions until Congress required that result
under a different theory.2 Finally, in section 337 cases, the courts
within the meaning of § 446(b). See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1982) (allowing the Secretary of the
Treasury to recompute a taxpayer's taxable income to clearly reflect income). The court
hastily agreed with the Commissioner's contention; the court, however, also addressed the
application of the tax benefit rule to the Spitalny facts because it perceived the tax benefit
rule to be the true basis for the Commissioner's adjustment.
The court realized that § 111 technically does not embrace a situation in which the
deduction and the subsequent recovery occur within the same taxable year. The court, how-
ever, considered the purpose of § 111 and concluded that it should apply with even greater
force in a case such as the present one. The court would have reached the same result-an
increase in the taxpayer's taxable income-regardless of whether the Commissioner de-
scribed the adjustment as the disallowance of an item of expense or as a restoration to
income following a deduction recovery. Under either interpretation the taxpayer could not
regard the recovery as a § 337 nonrecognition gain because such a position would distort
income materially. 430 F.2d at 198.
60. 430 F.2d at 198.
61. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
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have allowed section 111 to override section 337 nonrecognition 3
because there is an identifiable recovery and because Congress ap-
parently intended to limit section 337 nonrecognition to unrealized
appreciation in the market value of assets.64
In all of these cases under the single taxpayer construct of the
tax benefit rule, the courts could identify, objectively and unques-
tionably, an actual recovery-the threshold issue establishing the
relevance of section 111 prior to Bliss Dairy. The confusion rose in
determining whether section 111 overrode the nonrecognition pro-
vision in question. In the single taxpayer construct cases, the
courts either have avoided that issue entirely65 or have resolved the
issue occasionally in contravention of congressional views.6 6 In the
multiple taxpayer construct cases the courts have had difficulty in-
terpreting both section Ili's threshold applicability to, and its in-
teraction with various nonrecognition provisions.
B. Multiple Taxpayer Construct Applications
This section of the background examines the courts' applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule to three types of cases falling within the
multiple taxpayer construct-situations in which different entities
serve as the deducting and the recovering taxpayers. These cases
concern the distribution of previously expensed assets pursuant to
a section 336 liquidation, the inter vivos transfer of previously ex-
pensed assets by gift, and the transfer by bequest of previously
expensed assets at death. In these multiple taxpayer construct
cases, the traditional "recovery" language of the tax benefit rule
hindered the IRS from accomplishing its objective of disallowing or
63. But cf. Altec Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1795 (1977). In Altec Corp.
the tax court adopted a narrow exception to the general rule that the tax benefit rule over-
rides § 337 nonrecognition. In that case, ARC Liquidating Corporation (ARC) transferred
all of its assets pursuant to a plan of liquidation under § 337 to a subsidiary of Altec Corpo-
ration (Altec) in exchange for cash and Altec stock. These assets included approximately
$60,000 of supply items that ARC previously had expensed. The tax court analysis hinged
upon the existence of a "recovery" that corresponded to the previously deducted items and
caused a "conversion" of the expensed asset into "property." The court required that the
expensed asset have some value that the taxpayer subsequently recovered. The tax court
concluded that the supply items possessed such a nominal value that they received no con-
sideration in formulating a purchase price for ARC's assets. Because no recovery specifically
designated to those supply items occurred, no tax benefit rule income resulted. Id. at 1805.
See Corporate Liquidations Under Section 337, TAx MGmT. (BNA) No. 18-6th, at A-56
to -57 (1982).
64. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
1984] 1365
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
offsetting the original deduction. Although an actual physical re-
covery often occurred, it accrued to a different taxpayer than the
taxpayer who benefited from the prior deduction. 7 As a result, the
IRS naturally questioned the need for an actual, physical recovery
by the deducting taxpayer and shifted its support to a more liberal
interpretation of the tax benefit rule."
1. Applications of Section 111 to Section 336 Liquidations
In applying the tax benefit rule to section 336,9 the courts
have faced a task vastly different from applying that rule to sec-
tion 337. The difference in application results from the different
chronological sequence of a sale of the assets in a section 337 con-
text and a liquidating in-kind distribution by a corporation in a
section 336 context. For example, in Commissioner v. South Lake
Farms, Inc., ° South Lake Farms, Inc. (the old corporation) used
the accrual method of tax accounting for its farming operations,
but neither inventoried nor included in income the cost of crops
unharvested at year end. Rather, the old corporation properly de-
ducted cultivating and planting costs in the taxable year in which
it incurred them. As part of a pre-arranged plan for purchasing the
stock of and eventually liquidating the old corporation, a group of
individuals incorporated South Lake Farms (the new corpora-
tion).7 ' The new corporation assumed ownership and control of all
the old corporation's assets, including the unharvested crops, the
costs of which the old corporation previously had deducted.
Neither the new corporation nor the old corporation recognized
gain on the transaction. The new corporation computed its basis in
67. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
68. This background examines the split of authority that existed in the circuits prior
to Bliss Dairy regarding the requirement of an actual, physical recovery by the deducting
taxpayer before applying § 111 in a § 336 liquidation context. The courts specifically have
not addressed § Ill's applicability to the gift and death transfers mentioned above. The
case law discussed in this background, however, provides substantial insight into the ap-
proach the courts might use when confronted with the issue of § Ill's applicability in these
two areas.
69. This section provides that: "Except as provided in subsection (b) .. . and in sec-
tion 453B . . ., no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of
property in complete liquidation." I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982). In contrast to § 337, which con-
templates the disposal of assets by the corporation prior to the liquidating distribution,
§ 336 contemplates an in-kind distribution of corporate assets to the shareholders in com-
plete liquidation.
70. 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), afl'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
71. The purchase by the new corporation of the stock of the old corporation qualified
as "an arm's length transaction between unrelated parties." 324 F.2d at 838.
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the assets in accordance with section 334(b)(2),72 which provided
an acquiring corporation a stepped-up basis in the acquired corpo-
ration's assets equal to the price paid for the acquired corpora-
tion's stock. When the new corporation subsequently sold the
crops, it offset this stepped-up basis against the proceeds, with the
result that both the old and new corporations received deductions
for the costs attributable to production of the crops.
Before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,"3 the Commis-
sioner argued that a portion of the price the new corporation paid
to the old corporation's shareholders for the old corporation's stock
represented the fair market value of the zero basis crops. The
Commissioner, therefore, reasoned that the old corporation had re-
ceived an offset corresponding to its deductions for the costs of the
crops and should have included that offset in its income under a
tax benefit theory. The Commissioner relied primarily upon sec-
tion 446(b) 74 to support an adjustment of the old corporation's liq-
uidation year taxable income. The Commissioner, however,
blended into his argument the "recovery" and "tax benefit" lan-
guage of section 111. Because the prior deduction of the crop pro-
duction costs failed to reflect income clearly, the Commissioner in-
sisted that section 446(b) justified an adjustment of the old
corporation's income. The Commissioner, however, did not suggest
an alternative method of tax accounting that would have required
inclusion of the old corporations prior deductions within taxable
income. As a result, the court concluded that the use of section
446(b) under the South Lake Farms, Inc. facts would circumvent
the purpose and policy behind sections 334 and 336.11
72. See I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976), repealed by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, §§ 222(e)(1)(C), 224(b), 96 Stat. 480, 488. Under that section, the new corpora-
tion's basis in the unharvested crops bore the same proportion to the new corporation's cost
of the old corporation's stock as the fair market value of the unharvested crops bore to the
total fair market value of the assets received in the liquidation. See 36 T.C. at 1033.
73. At the tax court level, the Commissioner argued that § 482 permits the disallow-
ance of the old corporation's deduction for the crop production costs. See I.R.C. § 482
(1982) (allowing the Secretary of the Treasury, in order clearly to reflect income of the tax-
payers, to allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between two or more
organizations owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same interests). The tax
court rejected this argument on the ground that § 482 allows reallocation, but not disallow-
ance, of items affecting a taxpayer's income. 36 T.C. at 1042. The Commissioner did not
pursue this argument before the court of appeals.
74. See supra note 59.
75. 324 F.2d at 839. According to the court, § 334 effectively designates the new corpo-
ration as the purchaser of the assets because that corporation receives a stepped-up basis,
even though the new corporation actually purchased only stock from the old corporation's
original shareholders. Furthermore, the court interpreted § 336 as effectively substituting
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Turning to the Commissioner's tax benefit rule argument, the
court emphasized that the old corporation's shareholders received
the sale proceeds from the new corporation and paid a tax on the
resulting gain that equalled the excess of the sale proceeds over the
shareholders' adjusted basis in their stock.76 Because the old cor-
poration received nothing, the court concluded that no recovery oc-
curred and, therefore, that the Commissioner's tax benefit rule ar-
gument failed.77 The court rested its conclusion on a recovery
theory of the tax benefit rule. Under that theory, only an actual,
physical "recovery" 78 activates the inclusionary component of sec-
tion 111. In the case of actual expenses, as opposed to bad debt
reserves, the court's recovery theory requires a taxpayer to receive,
or become entitled to receive, money or property equal in value to
the amount of the prior deduction.79 Because the deducting tax-
payer, the old corporation, received nothing, the court held that
the tax benefit rule never became operative. The court realized the
windfall that its holding produced in favor of the original share-
holders of the old corporation, but resolved that the responsibility
to remedy this "loophole" rested with Congress. 0
The Sixth Circuit also addressed the application of the tax
benefit rule in the context of a section 336 liquidation in Tennes-
see-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner."1 In Tennes-
see-Carolina Transportation, Service Lines, Inc. (SLI) an accrual
basis corporate taxpayer, purchased tires for use in its motor
freight operations. SLI deducted the cost of the tires upon
purchase. Subsequently, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc.
(TCT) purchased all the stock of SLI from the SLI shareholders,
in hope of liquidating SLI and taking over its assets. SLI, pursuant
to section 336,82 recognized no gain on the distribution of its assets
to TCT, which took a stepped-up basis under section 334(b)(2)8" in
the shareholders of the old corporation for their corporation as the sellers of the assets for
tax purposes. Id.
76. This gain to the shareholders of the old corporation presumably would receive cap-
ital gain treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231(a) (1982).
77. 324 F.2d at 840.
78. See supra note 18.
79. 324 F.2d at 840.
80. Id. In his dissent, Judge Carter criticized the majority for ignoring the tax benefit
and assignment of income principles, and for erroneously insulating § 336 from the impact
of § 446 and § 482. Id. at 852 (Carter, J., dissenting).
81. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978).
82. See supra note 69.
83. See supra note 72. TCT also recognized no gain on the receipt of SLI's assets in
liquidation. See I.R.C. § 332(a) (1982).
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all the assets, including the previously expensed and zero basis
tires.8 4 Eventually, TCT also deducted from its gross income the
amount of stepped-up basis it had allocated to the assets previ-
ously expensed by SLI.
The Commissioner contended that the tax benefit rule re-
quired SLI to include in its income the value of the tires it distrib-
uted to TCT. In opposition, the taxpayer (TCT) argued that sec-
tion 111 became operative only following the actual "recovery" of
an amount previously deducted. 5 The Sixth Circuit rejected the
taxpayer's "recovery" theory because it produced an unnecessary
disparity between sections 336 and 337.86 According to the court,
application of the tax benefit rule required no actual, physical "re-
covery" of a tangible asset or receivable. Rather, the court applied
the rule flexibly to counteract the inflexibility of the annual ac-
counting concept.8 7 In order to support its flexible construction of
the tax benefit rule, the court, instead of using a recovery theory,
adopted an "inconsistent events" theory under which either an ac-
tual recovery of a previously deducted item, or the occurrence of
some other event inconsistent with a previous deduction, triggered
application of the tax benefit rule.8 " Under the Tennessee-Caro-
lina Transportation facts, the court decided that the transfer of
the previously expensed tires-which retained a substantial useful
life, even at the time of SLI's liquidation-with a step-up in basis
resulting for the transferee was sufficiently inconsistent with the
prior expensing of those tires by the transferor to invoke the tax
benefit rule."
Notwithstanding its holding that an application of the tax
benefit rule required no actual, physical recovery, the court
presented two arguments that supported an application of section
111 to the facts of the case even under a recovery theory. First, the
court created a "deemed" recovery that invoked the tax benefit
84. In the liquidation SLI distributed all its assets to TCT in exchange for the SLI
stock, which TCT held by virtue of an earlier purchase of the stock from the original SLI
shareholders. Subsequently, all of the SLI stock, now in the hands of SLI itself, was retired.
582 F.2d at 380.
85. The taxpayer's argument in Tennessee-Carolina Transportation mirrored the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc. See supra notes 69-80
and accompanying text.
86. 582 F.2d at 380.
87. Id. at 382. See generally Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. at 678 (ex-
plaining this interplay between the tax benefit rule and the annual tax accounting concept).




rule. This argument rested upon the presumption that SLI actually
consumed the assets when it expensed them. In order for the liqui-
dation to have occurred, therefore, the court found that SLI must
have "recovered" the assets at some point prior to the liquida-
tion.90 Second, the court reasoned that the liquidating corpora-
tion's receipt of its own stock as consideration for the liquidating
distribution constituted an economic recovery91 sufficient to invoke
the tax benefit rule.2
These section 336 cases illustrate the difficulties inherent in
applying the traditional recovery requirement of section 111 to
multiple taxpayer construct cases. Prior to Bliss Dairy, these in-
herent difficulties produced quite varied results when the circuit
courts addressed the conflict between sections 111 and 336. In
South Lake Farms, Inc. the court, adopting a recovery theory, re-
fused to apply section 111, but the Tennessee-Carolina Transpor-
tation court adopted an inconsistent events theory and applied the
tax benefit rule. Under other multiple taxpayer construct
cases-cases concerning the inter vivos transfer of previously ex-
pensed assets as gifts and the transfer by bequest of previously
expensed assets-the courts have not addressed the issue of sec-
tion 111 applicability. To establish a background against which to
examine the application of the tax benefit rule to such cases, the
following discussion explores the scope of these nonstatutory non-
recognition rules by analyzing their interrelation with other provi-
sions that provide, as section 111 does, for the recognition of in-
come not attributable to appreciation in asset value.
90. Id. Because the fictional recovery occurred before the liquidation, § 336 nonrecog-
nition did not encompass the resulting tax benefit rule income. See Note, supra note 56, at
714.
91. 582 F.2d at 382. The court realized that the stock possessed no value after the
liquidation because the corporation held no assets at that time. According to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, the stock's value immediately preceding the liquidation satisfied any recovery
requirement that § 111 might impose. Id.
92. In his dissent, Judge Weick disagreed with the majority's inconsistent event theory
application. Judge Weick emphasized that the regulations under § 111, see supra note 18,
required an actual recovery and, therefore, specifically prescribed a recovery theory. By ap-
plying that recovery theory, Judge Weick concluded that neither the deemed recovery argu-
ment nor the treasury stock recovery argument of the majority satisfied § 111. 582 F.2d at
383-85 (Weick, J., dissenting).
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2. Applications of Section 111 to Inter Vivos Gifts of Previously
Expensed Assets
In cases concerning gifts of assets, the courts generally have
provided broad nonrecognition for the donor. In Campbell v.
Prothro,3 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals estab-
lished that a gift of appreciated, unmortgaged property produced
no gain to the donor, notwithstanding his deduction of expendi-
tures that produced appreciation of the property's value. In Camp-
bell the taxpayer held ownership interests in various ranching
partnerships. By written instrument, the taxpayer donated live-
stock to a qualifying public charity.9 4 The taxpayer's cash basis
partnerships paid and deducted all costs of maintaining and rais-
ing the livestock.95 The Collector of Internal Revenue (the Collec-
tor), arguing that the taxpayer realized income regardless of
whether he gave the livestock or the proceeds from a sale of the
livestock," increased the taxpayer's income by the fair market
value of the livestock on the date of the gift. The taxpayer con-
tended that his income included only gain from the consummation
of a sale or exchange of his property for value. The court agreed
with the taxpayer and held that the donor's income excluded un-
realized appreciation in the value of the donated property, not-
withstanding that the property carried a zero basis in the donor's
hands and would have produced ordinary income upon sale as bus-
iness inventory.9 7 The taxpayer, therefore, deducted the full cost of
producing the donated property and the full fair market value of
the same property as a charitable donation, without any resulting
income recognition. 8
93. 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
94. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c) (1982) (defining qualifying charities for purposes of
deductibility of charitable contributions).
95. These deductions gave the partnership a zero basis in the livestock. In addition to
deducting the maintenance and breeding costs that passed through to the partners from the
partnerships, the taxpayer also deducted approximately $11,000-the fair market value of
the cattle-as a charitable contribution. 209 F.2d at 333 n.2(10).
96. Subsequent to making the gift, which the donor and donee summarized in a writ-
ten document, the taxpayer contracted to sell 792 calves to an unrelated third party and
directed that approximately $11,000 of the proceeds satisfy the donee's claim resulting from
the gift. The Collector argued that under the assignment of income doctrine the taxpayer's
gift consisted of the proceeds from the subsequent sale, rather than the cattle themselves.
See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 55. The court found that the written agreement constituted
a valid gift and, therefore, concluded that the taxpayer had donated the cattle and not the
proceeds. 209 F.2d at 334.
97. 209 F.2d at 335.
98. Interestingly, the court cited the 1954 equivalent of the current tax benefit rule,
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Some courts readily accepted the broad implications of Camp-
bell's nonrecognition rule in gift contexts. For example, in Evange-
lista v. Commissioner99 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
plained in dicta that the classification of a transfer as a gift
unquestionably determined its income tax consequences. 100 Al-
though the court noted that no Code provision specifically pre-
cluded gain recognition by the donor in a pure gift context, the
court interpreted Campbell as establishing that a gift produced no
income tax consequences. The court held that, under the Evange-
lista facts, no "gift" existed because the taxpayer had failed to
prove that the donated property's value exceeded the amount of
liabilities that the donee-trustee assumed. The court, therefore, re-
quired that the donor recognize income to the extent that the as-
sumed liabilities exceeded the donor's adjusted basis '01 in the
property. 02
but did not apply it to the instant facts. See id. at 336.
Campbell may appear at first glance to fit better within the single taxpayer construct
than the multiple taxpayer construct of § 111. That single taxpayer contruct classification
appears consistent with the view that the tax reduction produced by the charitable contri-
bution deduction was a "recovery" that accrued to the same taxpayer who benefited from
the original deduction of the cost of the donated property. The Campbell result, however,
should apply also when the taxpayer contributes to a noncharitable entity because the gov-
ernment's argument for an income adjustment appears even less compelling when the tax-
payer himself would not receive the benefit of a double deduction, as in the case of the
taxpayer's contribution of previously expensed property to a noncharitable entity. See
Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980). The Evangelista facts illustrate
that application of § 111 under a recovery theory requires examination of both the donor
and the donee as taxpayers. Under this analysis, the gift cases fit squarely within the multi-
ple taxpayer construct.
99. 629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980). In Evangelista the taxpayer operated an automobile
leasing business. After operating the business for one year, the taxpayer transferred his in-
terest in 33 of the operation's automobiles to a trust he established for the benefit of his
children. In addition to receiving the automobiles in trust, the trustee (the taxpayer's wife)
also assumed outstanding obligations originally incurred by the taxpayer and secured by the
automobiles themselves. None of the parties paid either income or gift taxes as a result of
this transaction. The Commissioner asserted that the transfer, whether interpreted as a gift
or otherwise, was a taxable disposition. The Commissioner also argued that the trustee's
assumption of the liabilities was taxable to the taxpayer to the extent the liabilities ex-
ceeded his adjusted basis in the automobiles.
100. Id. at 1221. To determine whether the transfer was a gift, the court inquired
objectively into all the facts of the transaction. This inquiry included consideration of
whether the transaction proceeded from a "detached and disinterested generosity." Id. at
1222 (quoting Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960)).
101. 629 F.2d at 1224-25. For a further explanation of the excess assumed liability
computation in other contexts, see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
102. Other courts refined the Campbell nonrecognition rule by precluding its applica-
tion in the net gift setting, in which the donor requires the donee to pay any resulting gift
taxes. For example, in Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982), the taxpayer-donor
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Other courts, however, have encountered difficulty in defining
the exact scope of the Campbell rule even in the context of a "pure
gift." In Estate of Levine v. Commissioner,'0 3 for example, the tax-
payer donated real estate to a trust he created for the benefit of his
grandchildren. In addition to receiving the real estate, the trustee-
donee also assumed a mortgage, interest, and other expense obliga-
tions totalling approximately $910,000. The Commissioner argued
that the taxpayer realized gain equal to the excess of the obliga-
tions that the donee assumed over the donor's adjusted basis in the
real estate.10 4 Relying upon the language of section 1001(c), 105 the
holding in Campbell,08 and the carryover basis rules of section
1012,107 the taxpayer argued that the Crane doctrine upon which
the Commissioner relied'08 did not control under the present facts
because the transaction was a gift.
Although the court recognized the potential conflict between
the Campbell rule and the Crane doctrine, it sidestepped that is-
sue by distinguishing the facts of Levine from those of Camp-
bell.09 The transaction in Levine fell short of a "pure gift" because
the donee assumed the personal obligations of the donor. The
court, therefore, applied the Crane doctrine and required the do-
gave appreciated securities upon the condition that the donee pay any resulting gift taxes.
The Court held that the donor realized income to the extent that the gift taxes the donee
paid exceeded the donor's adjusted basis in the property. Id. at 199-200. The Court ac-
knowledged Congress' desire to encourage gifts of property by limiting the resulting tax
consequences. In the case of a donor's release from gift tax liability assumed by the donee,
however, the Court placed the § 61 mandate of taxing income "from whatever source de-
rived" above any gift nonrecognition provision. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982). According to the
Court, any departure from the broad interpretation of § 61 in a net gift context should
originate in Congress, rather than in the courts. 457 U.S. at 199.
103. 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. The Commissioner relied upon Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). In
Crane the Court held that the amount realized on a sale of property, in exchange for cash
and subject to an existing mortgage, included the amount of cash realized plus the amount
of the mortgage, even though the seller had acquired the property subject to the mortgage
and even though the buyer neither paid nor assumed that mortgage. Id. at 14.
105. The taxpayer argued that because the section defining gains and losses refers to a
"sale or other disposition of property," see I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982), and because the section
that designates when to recognize those gains and losses refers to a "sale or exchange of
property," id. § 1001(c), Congress must have intended to postpone the recognition of gain
resulting from a gift. 634 F.2d at 15.
106. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
107. This section provides that the donee carries over or acquires the donor's basis in
gift property. I.R.C. § 1012 (1982). The taxpayer argued that such a carryover basis provi-
sion reflects Congress' intent to postpone gain recognition until the donee subsequently dis-
poses of the property. 634 F.2d at 15-16.
108. See supra note 104.
109. 634 F.2d. at 16.
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nor to recognize income equal to the excess of the amount he real-
ized, including the assumed obligations, over his adjusted basis in
the real estate. In dicta, however, the court suggested an approach
for applying the Crane doctrine in a pure gift setting. By compar-
ing current section 1001(c) with its predecessor, the court sug-
gested that Congress intended by amending section 1001(c) to
limit nonrecognition to certain types of transactions described in
detail elsewhere in the Code and that Congress did not intend to
provide nonrecognition treatment for dispositions other than
"sales and exchanges." In support of its analysis, the court cited
section 1002's legislative history, which explains that section 1001
requires recognition of gain or loss except as otherwise provided in
the Code. n0 Although the court expressly refused to decide
whether the Crane doctrine applies in a pure gift context, it also
expressly refused to reject that possibility, even in light of
Campbell."'
In summary, these pure and partial gift cases reflect a poten-
tial erosion of the broad Campbell nonrecognition rule, especially
for income originating from sources other than the appreciation in
value of the donated property. This erosion presumably also would
trigger an application of the tax benefit rule to pure gift transac-
tions. Application of the tax benefit rule to pure gifts subjects the
ultimate decision regarding tax benefit rule income recognition to
the courts' choice of tax benefit rule theories. Under the South
Lake Farms, Inc."' recovery theory, even if the tax benefit rule
applies because of a narrow interpretation of Campbell, the rule
requires no income recognition because the donor realizes no ac-
tual recovery. Under the Tennessee-Carolina Transportation" in-
consistent events theory, however, the tax benefit rule applies and
requires income recognition, presumably by the donor." 4
110. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 422, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4629, 5065.
111. 634 F.2d at 17.
112. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
114. For example, a gift by a taxpayer-father to his son of assets the father previously
had expensed in his proprietorship operations presumably is an inconsistent event triggering
tax benefit rule income to the father under the multiple taxpayer construct/inconsistent
event theory tax benefit rule. The opposite result, however, apparently accrues under the
single taxpayer construct/recovery theory tax benefit rule.
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3. Applications of Section 111 to Bequests of Previously
Expensed Assets
In cases of transfers of assets by bequest, the case law reveals
a more settled and consistent history of nonrecognition, which en-
compasses both the transfer from the decedent to his estate and
the transfer from the estate to the designated legatee.1 1 5 Revenue
Ruling 73-183116 reflects the current IRS position that a decedent's
final personal income tax return need not reflect any gain or loss as
a result of the transfer of assets to the executor of the decedent's
estate. The IRS bases its position on Congress' intention that the
transfer of property to an executor or administrator does not con-
stitute a taxable realization of income, notwithstanding the appre-
ciation of the value of the decedent's property during his life-
time.1 1 7 In Revenue Ruling 73-183 a taxpayer 118 held stock with a
basis of thirty dollars per share. At the taxpayer's death, the fair
market value of the stock had dropped to twenty dollars per share.
The IRS determined that the decedent would recognize no loss on
his final personal tax return because of the transfer of securities to
his estate. In addition, the IRS noted that the taxpayer would rec-
ognize no gain on that transfer if the stock had appreciated in
value prior to his death.119
Similarly, prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (the 1984
Act),12 a transfer from an estate to a legatee of property pursuant
to a specific bequest produced no taxable realization of income to
the estate, to the decedent, or to the legatee. An examination of
several cases will illustrate the scope of these pre-1984 nonrecogni-
tion rules. For example, in Suisman v. Eaton121 the decedent be-
queathed $50,000 to each of his children, but deferred distribution
until each child reached the age of twenty-five. The decedent left
the residue of his estate to his wife. When the youngest child
reached the required age, the executor transferred to that child
stock with a fair market value of approximately $50,000. The trus-
tee claimed that the stock transfer in satisfaction of the pecuniary
115. But cf. infra notes 108-09 & 113 and accompanying text.
116. Rev. Rul. 183, 1973-1 C.B. 364.
117. Id.
118. The taxpayer in this ruling was not a dealer in securities. The IRS indicated that
different rules would apply to a securities dealer. Id. at 365.
119. Id.
120. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 81, 98 Stat. 494, 597 (codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 643(d)).
121. 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935).
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legacy was not a taxable property disposition by the estate. Ac-
cording to the court, however, the transfer of the stock did consti-
tute a "sale or other disposition" taxable under the predecessor of
current section 1001.122
In Kenan v. Commissioner'2" the court emphasized the gen-
eral pre-1984 Act rule of nonrecognition that applied when an es-
tate distributed property in satisfaction of a specific bequest, and
explained that the Suisman holding was only an exception that ap-
plied when an executor satisfied a pecuniary bequest by distribut-
ing appreciated property held by the estate. In Kenan the testatrix
provided in her will for annual payments to her niece until that
niece reached age forty. At that time, the niece would receive five
million dollars from the estate. The trustee eventually paid the five
million dollar bequest, partially in cash and partially in securities.
Because the securities had appreciated in value, the Commissioner
determined that the distribution of those assets produced a taxable
gain to the estate. The trustee contended that the estate realized
no income or gain of any character from the distribution of the
securities to a legatee pursuant to the terms of a valid will. In es-
sence, the trustee argued that the transfer fell within the general
pre-1984 Act nonrecognition rule that covers a trustee's transfer of
specific property bequeathed to a specific legatee. The court, how-
ever, distinguished the transfer in Kenan from a transfer of prop-
erty in satisfaction of a specific bequest. The niece in Kenan as-
sumed no risk that the stock would appreciate or depreciate in
value between the date of decedent's death and the date of the
distribution; whereas a legatee of specific property does assume
such risks. Based upon this distinction, the court concluded that
when a legatee does not take property specifically bequeathed to
him and assumes no interest in the corpus of the trust that could
appreciate or depreciate in value prior to distribution, the trustee
realizes and recognizes gain upon the distribution of estate prop-
erty to settle a claim for money against the estate.
12 4
122. See supra note 105 (analyzing current § 1001, which defines "gain" or "loss" as
the difference between the amount realized on a sale or other disposition of property and
the transferor's adjusted basis in that property). The predecessor provision was the Revenue
Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202, 43 Stat. 253, 255 (current version of I.R.C. § 1001 (1982)). The
court reasoned that the estate received the discharge of the legatee's right to receive $50,000
in exchange for the disposition of the stock. The excess of the $50,000 fair market value of
the legatee's claim over the estate's basis in the stock constituted a taxable gain to the
estate. 15 F. Supp. at 115.
123. 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
124. Id. at 219-20.
1376 [Vol. 37:1351
1984] TAX BENEFIT RULE 1377
In general terms, when the estate satisfies a pecuniary bequest
with appreciated property, the estate recognizes gain equal to the
difference between the estate's basis in the property and the prop-
erty's market value at the time of transfer to the legatee.125 The
estate's basis equals the property's market value '26 at the time of
the decedent's death, and the legatee's basis equals the amount of
the pecuniary bequest because the legatee tendered his claim to
that bequest in exchange for the property.1 17 If, however, the lega-
tee receives designated property pursuant to a specific bequest, the
legatee's basis, prior to the 1984 Act, equalled the property's fair
market value at the decedent's death,2 " and no income recognition
resulted to the decedent, to the estate, or to the legatee. 2 9 Under
either of these options, the appreciation prior to the decedent's
death forever escapes taxation regardless of whether the pre-1984
Act law or the 1984 Act applies.130 The appreciation after the dece-
dent's death and prior to the distribution to the legatee constitutes
taxable gain to the legatee upon his subsequent disposition, in the
case of a distribution of the property in satisfaction of a specific
bequest,'31 or to the estate, in the case of a distribution of the
property in satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest.3 2 Because the tax
system eventually taxes the realization of appreciation occurring
125. This treatment applies under both the pre-1984 Act law and the law as modified
by the 1984 Act.
126. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a)-(c) (computation of the estate's gain), 1014(a), (b)(1) (ex-
planation of the basis of the decedent's property in the hands of an executor) (1982).
127. This provision prevents the double taxation of the appreciation that occurs while
the estate holds the property. See 114 F.2d at 220.
128. See I.R.C. § 1014(a), (b)(1) (1982).
129. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Under the 1984 Act, the distribu-
tion of appreciated property from an estate or trust to a beneficiary pursuant to a specific
bequest results in gain to the estate or trust if the executor or trustee so elects. Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 81(a), 98 Stat. 494, 597 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 643(d)(3)). As a result of that election, the estate or trust recognizes the appreciation that
occurs between the date of decedent's death and the date of distribution of the property to
the beneficiary, as if the beneficiary had bought the property. The beneficiary accordingly
receives a basis in the property equal to its fair market value at distribution. Id.
Absent such an election by the executor or trustee, the estate or trust recognizes no gain
on the distribution. As a result, the beneficiary receives a carryover basis in the property
equal to its fair market value at the date of decedents death. The beneficiary, therefore,
must pay the tax on any appreciation of the property during the period between the date of
decedent's death and the date of distribution. Id.
130. See 2 B. BirrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION Op INcOME, ESTATES AND GnTs 1140.3, at 40-
10; 1 40.4.2, at 40-13 (1981); see also I.R.C. § 1014(a), (b)(1) (1982).
131. But cf. supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
132. This treatment applies to distributions under the law existing prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1984 or to distributions to which the Act applies and to which no election
under the Act extends. See I.R.C. § 1014(a), (b)(1) (1982).
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after the decedent's death, the tax benefit rule should apply to
other realization events that occur after the decedent's death, pro-
vided the statutory, mechanical prerequisites for the rule's applica-
tion are met. Under the single taxpayer construct/recovery theory
tax benefit rule, no section 111 income results from such a realiza-
tion after the decedent's death because no actual recovery accrued
to the taxpayer who benefited from the prior deduction-the dece-
dent. Upon such a realization after the decedent's death, however,
section 111 would require income recognition presumably by the
decedent under the multiple taxpayer construct/inconsistent event
theory tax benefit rule. 33 In cases of transfers by gift and transfers
by bequest, therefore, the ultimate recognition of tax benefit rule
income depends upon the court's choice of tax benefit rule
theories.
In summary, this background illustrates the traditional lim-
ited applicability of the tax benefit rule-the limitation of section
111 to the single taxpayer construct cases;13 4 the threshold expan-
sion of the rule into a multiple taxpayer construct setting-the sec-
tion 336 liquidation cases;13 5 and the potential applicability of the
rule to other multiple taxpayer construct settings-transfers by in-
ter vivos gift and by bequest.136 Against this background, the
United States Supreme Court in Bliss Dairy faced the task of de-
fining the nature, scope, and purpose of the tax benefit rule as it
relates to these multiple taxpayer construct cases.
III. United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.
In United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.37 a closely held, cash ba-
sis corporate taxpayer, Bliss Dairy, Inc. (Bliss Dairy), deducted as
an ordinary and necessary business expense the cost of cattle feed
purchased for use in its dairy operations. Although Bliss Dairy
133. Assume, for example, that prior to his death, the transferor-decedent deducted
the cost of certain assets he used in a proprietorship. At his death, he transferred by will the
assets to his son, who received a stepped-up basis and deducted that basis pursuant to his
own proprietorship operations. The subsequent deduction by the legatee-son is an event
inconsistent with the prior deduction by the decedent-father, and thereby triggers § 111
income recognition under the multiple taxpayer construct/inconsistent event theory tax
benefit rule. Because the realization event-the subsequent deduction by the son-occurs
after the father's death, the Campbell and Kenan holdings arguably do not provide nonrec-
ognition for this § 111 income.
134. See supra notes 18-66 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 93-132 and accompanying text.
137. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
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claimed the deduction in the year it purchased the feed, a substan-
tial portion of the feed remained unused at that year's end. Two
days into the next taxable year, Bliss Dairy adopted a plan of liq-
uidation and distributed all of its assets, including the remaining
cattle feed, to its shareholders. Relying upon section 336, Bliss
Dairy reported no income or gain on the liquidating distribution.
After liquidation of Bliss Dairy, the former shareholders continued
the dairy activities in noncorporate form and elected the limited
gain recognition on liquidation provided by section 333138 and the
basis calculation specified in section 334(c). 139 As a result, a por-
tion of the basis of the cattle feed supported double deduc-
tions-one corporate deduction before liquidation and another
shareholder deduction after liquidation.
A. Applicability of Section 111
The Commissioner argued that Bliss Dairy realized income
equal to the value of the feed distributed to its shareholders. In
opposition, Bliss Dairy relied upon section 336 to preclude the rec-
ognition of income upon liquidation. The United States District
Court for the District of Arizona held for Bliss Dairy 40 and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the Government relied solely upon
an inconsistent events theory tax benefit rule, which would require
income recognition in the amount of a deduction when subsequent
events inconsistent with that deduction occur. The Government ar-
138. This section provides that if a corporation distributes property in complete liqui-
dation and the distribution completely cancels or redeems all stock, each electing share-
holder recognizes the resulting gain as a dividend to the extent of his share of accumulated
earnings and profits after February 28, 1913. The remaining gain receives capital gain treat-
ment, but only to the extent that it does not exceed the excess of the value of assets that the
shareholder receives, which consist of money, stock, or securities that the corporation ac-
quired after December 31, 1953, over his share of accumulated earnings and profits. I.R.C.
§ 333(a), (e) (1982).
139. This section provides that the basis of property that a shareholder of a liquidat-
ing corporation acquires in cancellation or redemption of his stock pursuant to a § 333 elec-
tion, see supra note 138, shall equal the basis of the cancelled stock, decreased by the
amount of cash the shareholder receives and increased by the shareholder's recognized gain.
I.R.C. § 334(c) (1982).
After allocating the total § 334(c) basis over all the assets received in relation to their
net fair market values, see Treas. Reg. § 1.334-2 (1955), the basis to the shareholder in Bliss
Dairy of the feed exceeded zero-the corporation's basis in the feed after expensing it at the
time of purchase. The shareholder subsequently deducted this basis as an ordinary and nec-
essary business expense. 460 U.S. at 374.
140. See 460 U.S. at 376.
141. See 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981).
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gued that this treatment would apply without regard to the exis-
tence of an actual, physical recovery. In opposition, the taxpayer
insisted that section 111 requires income recognition only for prior
deductions actually recovered in later years, and that the Bliss
Dairy facts failed to satisfy this recovery theory requirement.
142
The Court disagreed with the arguments advanced by each lit-
igant and instead developed its own two-part analysis for applica-
tion of section 111 in the context of nonrecognition provisions of
the Code. First, the Court decided whether the facts merited any
consideration of the tax benefit rule. This threshold inquiry re-
quired the Court to determine whether a "recovery" had occurred
or, even more basically, whether section 111 required a recovery at
all.143 Second, after establishing the applicability of section 111,
the Court decided whether the tax benefit rule income fell within
the type of "gain" or "income" shielded from taxation by the rele-
vant nonrecognition provision.144
In relation to the first part of its analysis, the Court summar-
ily rejected the recovery theory on the ground that it neither
served the purpose of section 111 nor accurately reflected the ex-
isting case law under section 111.145 Instead, the Court adopted a
modified version of the Government's inconsistent events theory.
Emphasizing that the tax benefit rule's purpose is to achieve trans-
actional tax parity, the Court decided that section 111 offsets an
earlier deduction only upon the occurrence of a subsequent event
"fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduc-
tion was initially based. ' 146 In applying this fundamentally incon-
sistent events test to the facts of Bliss Dairy, the Court analogized
Bliss Dairy's asset distribution to its shareholders to the conver-
sion of an expensed business asset to a nonbusiness use. According
to the Court, the fundamental inconsistency between the asset dis-
tribution and the prior deduction required recognition of income in
an amount equal to the prior unwarranted deduction.
147
142. 460 U.S. at 381, 395-96.
143. Id. at 381, 395-96.
144. Id. at 385-86, 397.
145. Id. at 382.
146. Id. at 383.
147. Id. at 402. The Court emphasized that its holding was consistent with Nash. See
supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. In applying the first tier of its Bliss Dairy analy-
sis to the Nash facts, the Court decided that neither a recovery nor a fundamentally incon-
sistent event had occurred in Nash. 460 U.S. at 389-90. Apparently, the mere transfer of
assets independent of any resulting double deduction potential was not a fundamentally
inconsistent event triggering § 111. Bliss Dairy concerned a conversion from corporate to
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B. Conflict Between Section 111 and Section 336
Having determined that the tax benefit rule applied under the
Bliss Dairy facts, the Court, in the second tier of its analysis, faced
the question whether section 111 overrode section 336 nonrecogni-
tion. The Court expressly declined to endorse the view that the tax
benefit rule always prevails over a nonrecognition provision.
Rather, the Court purported to offer an analysis for determining
the controlling doctrine in any specific setting.48 In determining
whether section 111 overrode section 336, the Court interpreted
section 336 as a nonrecognition provision for income attributable
to unrealized market appreciation and not as a shield against rec-
ognition of all types of income that might arise from disposition of
an asset. The Court cited three sources in support of this proposi-
tion. First, Congress enacted section 336 to codify the holding of
General Utilities Co. v. Helvering149-that a corporation recog-
nizes no gain upon the distribution of appreciated property to its
shareholders. The Court, therefore, assumed that Congress in-
tended section 336 coverage to extend only to unrealized apprecia-
tion or depreciation in asset value. Second, neither Congress nor
the courts had interpreted the section 336 nonrecognition provi-
sion as being absolute. For example, the depreciation recapture
provisions of sections 1245 and 1250 require income recognition in
a section 336 context and thereby override section 336 nonrecogni-
tion.150 Last, courts consistently have applied the assignment of in-
proprietary form. Nash, however, concerned a conversion from proprietary to corporate
form. Only the presence of a double deduction potential in Bliss Dairy distinguished the
substance of the Bliss Dairy conversion from the Nash conversion. Nevertheless, the Court
applied the tax benefit rule in Bliss Dairy but did not apply it in Nash, even under the
analysis formulated in Bliss Dairy. Apart from any double deduction consideration, to
which the court expressly did not attribute its holding in Bliss Dairy, the consistency of
Bliss Dairy with Nash is questionable. See Yin, Supreme Court's Tax Benefit Rule Deci-
sion: Unanswered Questions Invite Future Litigation, 59 J. TAX'N 130 (1983).
The Court further explained that it did not distinguish fundamentally inconsistent
events from nonfundamentally inconsistent events. Rather, the Court distinguished funda-
mentally inconsistent events from merely unexpected events. For example, the unexpected
destruction by fire of a leased building would not constitute a fundamentally inconsistent
event triggering § 111. In such a case, only an actual recovery of the prior rental payment
would require tax benefit rule recapture. 460 U.S. at 384-85. Again, the Court's concern with
the double deduction potential appears paramount.
148. 460 U.S. at 386 n.20.
149. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
150. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3) (1982) (omitting § 336 from the list of tax
free transactions partially excepted from depreciation recapture). See infra note 175 (ex-
plaining the recapture provisions of § 1245 and § 1250).
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come doctrine15' to distributions in liquidation under section
336.152
Additionally, the Court, believing that the traditional role of
section 111 in the section 337 context likewise should control in
the section 336 setting, compared the language and purpose of sec-
tions 336 and 337. According to the Court, Congress enacted sec-
tion 337 to achieve identical tax treatment under both sections 336
and 337.153 Because the courts had held consistently that the tax
benefit rule overrides section 337 nonrecognition, T the Court con-
cluded that section 336 should receive similar treatment. The
Court, therefore, required Bliss Dairy to include in income the
amount of the prior "unwarranted deduction.
1 55
IV. ANALYSIS: THE TAX BENEFIT RULE AFTER Bliss Dairy
This part of the Note examines the two tiers of the Court's
analysis in Bliss Dairy, explains the apparent purposes behind the
Court's holding in each tier and extrapolates from those holdings a
prediction of the outcome of conflicts between the tax benefit rule
and the specific nonrecognition provisions discussed above. This
Note concludes that the first tier of the Court's analysis, in which
the Court purported merely to choose between available tax bene-
fit rule theories, greatly expanded the rule's scope by shifting from
the single taxpayer construct to the multiple taxpayer construct.
This analysis further concludes that the second tier of the Bliss
Dairy holding creates wholly unworkable and unpredictable stan-
151. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
152. 460 U.S. at 398-99.
153. See supra note 56 (explaining the inconsistent case law that motivated Congress
to equalize the tax treatment in § 336 and § 337 settings).
154. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
155. 460 U.S. at 402. In dissent, Justice Stevens interpreted Nash as adopting a recov-
ery theory of the tax benefit rule and criticized the majority's shift to the fundamentally
inconsistent events theory. Justice Stevens viewed the majority holding as the adoption of a
"new doctrine . . . of the Court's own making." Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Jus-
tice Stevens' view, the tax benefit rule always had required an inconsistent event, but such
an inconsistent event never had been itself a sufficient justification for invoking § 111. Id. at
408. Because Congress had not adopted the inconsistent event theory and because he viewed
that theory as being vague and complex, Justice Stevens rejected the inconsistent event
theory in favor of the recovery theory.
Justice Stevens viewed the potentially untaxed step-up in basis as an insufficient justifi-
cation for the drastic measure of applying the tax benefit rule. Rather, in his view, the
provisions of § 333 and § 334 expressly contemplated such basis step-ups without income
adjustment. He felt that if Congress or the courts disliked the double deduction potential,
the responsibility rested with Congress to alter § 162, § 334, or § 336 to correct for the
windfall. Id. at 420-21.
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dards for determining when the tax benefit rule overrides a given
nonrecognition provision-standards that courts reasonably could
interpret as extensions of the rule to a number of tax areas the
courts previously assumed to be beyond the rule's scope. 156
A. Applications of the Recovery Theory Versus the
Fundamentally Inconsistent Events Theory
The first phase of the Court's analysis in Bliss Dairy con-
cerned the threshold inquiry of whether section 111 applied in va-
rious factual settings. The Court adopted, as the standard for mak-
ing this determination, the fundamentally inconsistent events
theory rather than the recovery theory of the tax benefit rule.157
Application of section 111 in a factual setting conducive to the
purpose and the logistical prerequisites of the rule, however, re-
quires no such selection among available theories. By statutory and
regulatory design, section 111 applies only when a taxpayer bene-
fits from a deduction and, in a subsequent year, "recovers" the
item for which he previously and properly took a deduction. 5 ' In
the single taxpayer construct cases, the usual manifestation of an
inconsistent event is an actual recovery. 159 Indeed, in such cases,
an actual, physical recovery follows inevitably from an event that
is fundamentally inconsistent with the prior deduction. 160 As a re-
156. This analysis considers only the recovery and fundamentally inconsistent events
theories and excludes the inconsistent events theory because the former theories were ac-
cepted by the courts before and after the Bliss Dairy decision. For this reason, they provide
the most relevant and insightful comparison, for purposes of this analysis, of the status of
the tax benefit rule before and after Bliss Dairy.
157. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 8 & 18 and accompanying text.
159. Comment, The Tax Benefit Rule: Recovery Reevaluated, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV.
533, 561 (1982).
160. In each of the single taxpayer construct situations discussed in part II, the
Court's adoption of the fundamentally inconsistent events theory and rejection of the recov-
ery theory amounted to a needless formality because the single taxpayer situations fulfill the
"mechanical" requirements for application of § 111 under either theory. For example, in a
§ 118 context, the cancellation of an accrued salary obligation that a corporation owes its
shareholder-employee in exchange for the issuance of the corporation's stock is simultane-
ously an actual recovery, see generally supra note 18 (explaining the regulation's definition
of a "recovery"), and an event fundamentally inconsistent with the premise upon which the
corporation previously deducted that salary, see generally supra notes 145-46 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the Bliss Dairy fundamentally inconsistent event requirement). Simi-
larly, if a taxpayer makes a § 351 transfer of accounts receivable, against which a reserve for
bad debts exists, to a corporation at face value in exchange for stock worth more than the
receivable's net value the transaction constitutes both an actual recovery, see, e.g., supra
notes 26-33 and accompanying text, and an event fundamentally inconsistent with the prior
deduction of the bad debt reserve, see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. Finally,
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sult, the Court's selection and distinction between the recovery
theory and the fundamentally inconsistent events theory is a mere
semantic distinction.
The reasons for the Court's selection and distinction between
the recovery and fundamentally inconsistent events theories be-
come obvious when the analysis shifts to the application of these
theories in the multiple taxpayer construct cases. A common fact
pattern pervades these cases: the purchasing taxpayer deducts the
asset cost and then transfers the asset in a manner that produces
no actual recovery to that taxpayer, but does arise out of an event
that is inconsistent with the prior deduction. The tax benefit rule,
therefore, applies to the multiple taxpayer construct cases under
an inconsistent events theory, but not under a recovery theory.
1 6 '
In Bliss Dairy the Court found that such a transfer, which pro-
duced no actual recovery to the transferor, but which did involve
an event fundamentally inconsistent with a prior deduction by the
transferor, tainted the prior deduction with an appearance of im-
propriety or inequity.16 2 To cure that aura of impropriety, the
Court replaced the recovery requirement of the tax benefit rule
with the more flexible fundamentally inconsistent events standard,
the result of which-an income adjustment under section 111 to
offset the prior deduction-the Court found more equitable. This
choice between available tax benefit rule theories, however, is only
the byproduct of a much more significant effect of the Bliss Dairy
holding. Without expressly stating its intention to do so, the Court
broadened the scope of the tax benefit rule to encompass the mul-
tiple taxpayer construct cases as well as the single taxpayer con-
struct cases. That expansion destroyed the equivalence of the re-
covery and fundamentally inconsistent events theories and forced
the Court to adopt the latter theory to apply section 111 to the
in a § 337 liquidation context, a liquidating corporation's sale of previously expensed assets
to another taxpayer who receives a basis in those assets greater than zero constitutes both
an actual recovery, see, e.g., supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text, and an event funda-
mentally inconsistent with the premise upon which the liquidating corporation based the
prior deduction, see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 70-92, 112-14 & 130-32 and accompanying text.
162. Arguably, no impropriety or inequity resulted from the prior deduction. In the
case of an expensable asset, as opposed to a capital asset, a cash basis taxpayer properly
deducts the cost of the asset upon purchase. Bliss Dairy's deduction of the feed upon
purchase appears entirely appropriate under its cash basis of tax accounting. Any perceived
inequitable "tax benefit" resulted from the express provisions of the Code allowing a basis
recomputation under § 334(c). See, e.g., Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d




The Court's fundamentally inconsistent event requirement for
tax benefit rule application extends section 111 to each of the mul-
tiple taxpayer construct situations described in part II of this
Note. This greater applicability of section 111 effectively shifts the
ultimate resolution of tax benefit rule implementation to the sec-
ond phase of the Court's analysis, in which the Court measured the
scope of the nonrecognition provision to determine whether it pre-
cluded section 111 "gain."' 4 The following sections of this analysis
will compare the results under the second phase of the Bliss Dairy
decision with the results under the case law existing prior to that
decision, and will project the probable effect of the Court's holding
on the nonrecognition provisions discussed in part I1.165
B. Applications of Bliss Dairy and the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980 to Section 118 Settings
With respect to section 118, the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
(the Act) leaves no doubt as to the proper tax treatment of a situa-
tion in which a shareholder-creditor cancels, in exchange for stock,
a salary obligation that his corporation owes him. 6' Had the Act
provided no such guidance in this section 118 context, however, the
Bliss Dairy analysis interestingly would require a vastly different
treatment of these section 118 situations than the Act, as enacted,
requires. The Code,' 67 the regulations,6 8 the legislative history,
6 9
and the case law170 prior to the Act supported a very broad nonrec-
163. An actual recovery arguably existed even under the Bliss Dairy facts. This recov-
ery resulted from the reduced tax liability of the transferee-shareholders who subsequently
deducted the stepped-up basis produced by § 334(c). See supra note 138 and accompanying
text. This recovery, however, accrued to a different taxpayer from the taxpayer who previ-
ously had deducted the asset cost. In short, the Court could have reached the same result in
Bliss Dairy under the recovery theory, but such an approach would have required the Court
to state expressly its adoption of the multiple taxpayer construct of § 111. Apparently, the
Court wished to avoid such an explicit statement.
164. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
165. This Note omits any analysis of the Bliss Dairy tax benefit rule's application to
§ 336 and § 337 because the Court addressed these sections in the Bliss Dairy decision.
166. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
167. See T.R.C. § 118(a) (1982).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956) (providing an "exclusion from gross income with
respect to any contribution of money or property to the capital of the taxpayer").
169. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4025, 4175 (explaining that § 118 merely restates the previously existing case
law holding that corporate income excludes contributions to the capital of the corporation)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1337].
170. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-1980 perception
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ognition provision. The Bliss Dairy standard undoubtedly would
have precluded the section 111 adjustment in a section 118 context
in the absence of the Act and the guidance it provides. This result
under the Bliss Dairy analysis, however, differs greatly from the
result accruing under the Act.'7 1 The vast difference between the
Bliss Dairy result and the Act's treatment illustrates the greatest
problem with the Bliss Dairy holding. The application of that
holding to cases concerning the tax benefit rule and nonrecognition
provisions generally depends upon the inexact task of interpreting
statutes enacted without Congressional consideration of their im-
pact upon section 111. Had Congress not addressed in the Act the
tax results of the section 118 situation described above, the Bliss
Dairy holding would have left the tax treatment of those facts to
the courts and probably would have produced a result quite differ-
ent from the result under the Act.
C. Applications of Bliss Dairy-to Section 351 Exchanges
The application of Bliss Dairy becomes quite speculative in
situations in which Congress has not defined the scope of the non-
recognition provisions at issue or the impact of the tax benefit rule
on those nonrecognition provisions. For example, the application of
Bliss Dairy in a section 351 context, which Congress has not ad-
dressed specifically, requires the consideration of factors that sup-
port the nonrecognition of section 111 income, as well as other fac-
tors that support the application of section 111 over section 351's
nonrecognition provision. In support of recognition, the Code
strongly suggests that section 351(a) contemplates substantially
less than an absolute prohibition of all income recognition in a sec-
tion 351 transaction. For example, section 351(b) requires that the
transferor recognize gain or loss if he receives money or property
other than stock or securities in exchange for his contribution of
property.172 Additionally, section 357(a) requires that a section 351
transferor recognize a limited amount of income when he transfers
property subject to a liability in excess of the transferor's adjusted
basis. 73 Furthermore, the committee reports discussing section 351
indicate a congressional intent that other applicable gain and loss
that § 118 did not yield to the notion of tax benefit).
171. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (explaining the debtor-corpora-
tion's option to defer recognition of the debt discharge income by reducing the basis of
depreciable assets at the time of cancellation).
172. I.R.C. § 351(b) (1982).
173. Id. § 357(a).
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recognition provisions of the Code apply to a section 351 transac-
tion when a disproportion exists between the value of the property
transferred to the corporation and the amount of stock and securi-
ties received by the transferor. 174 Each of these provisions illus-
trates Congress' intent that section 351(a) should not shield all in-
come from recognition in a section 351 transfer and supports the
proposition that section 111 overrides section 351(a) when the
transferor contributes previously expensed assets to a corporation
in exchange for stock equal to the property's fair market value.
The depreciation recapture rules,175 on the other hand, present
significant opposition to application of the tax benefit rule over
section 351(a). In a section 351 transfer, the Code provides for de-
preciation recapture to the transferor only to the extent of the gain
he recognized as a result of that transfer.176 Because these depreci-
ation recapture provisions are the equivalent of a tax benefit rule
regulating depreciation recapture177 and because the Bliss Dairy
Court emphasized these recapture provisions very strongly in its
analysis,'178 these recapture rules must carry substantial weight in
an application of Bliss Dairy to section 351 .179 Because section 351
generally provides for nonrecognition of transfers within its scope
and because the depreciation recapture rules require income recog-
174. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 169, at 4254-55. The 1939 Code's predecessor
to § 351 allowed nonrecognition only if the stock or securities received by each transferor
substantially reflected his proportionate interest in the property prior to the exchange. The
1954 amendments eliminated this broad limitation upon § 351 nonrecognition. Even under
the 1954 Code, however, the § 351 distribution was a taxable event to the extent of the
existing disproportion between the value of the property transferred and the amount of
stock and securities each transferor received. Id. Both the 1939 Code and the 1954 Code
treatment illustrate that Congress did not intend to shield all income in a § 351 context
from recognition.
175. See I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1982). Generally, § 1245 and § 1250 provide that upon
the sale or exchange of a capital asset, a limited portion of the resulting gain receives ordi-
nary income treatment. The ordinary income treatment for § 1245 assets is limited in
amount to prior depreciation deductions while the ordinary income treatment of § 1250
assets cannot exceed the excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation. In a § 351
transfer, the Code limits the transferor's "recapture" to the amount of gain he recognizes
under § 351(a). Because § 351(a) generally provides for nonrecognition, the Code generally
precludes § 1245 and § 1250 recapture to the transferor in such situations.
176. Id. §§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3).
177. See O'Hare, supra note 29, at 216.
178. 460 U.S. at 386 n.20, 398.
179. The difference between depreciating an asset over time and expensing it immedi-
ately upon purchase suggests that the depreciation recapture rules should not control the
application of § 111 in a nonrecognition transaction under § 351. This distinction, however,
fades in light of the Code's requirement of full recapture upon disposition of an asset ex-
pensed under § 179-a provision allowing immediate asset write off on a limited basis. See
I.R.C. § 179 (1982).
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nition only where the transferor recognizes gain on the transfer,
the argument by analogy is that the tax benefit rule likewise
should require no income recognition in such exchanges.
To complicate matters further, in a section 351 transfer the
unrecognized recapture potential carries over to the transferee-cor-
poration. When the original transferee-corporation disposes of the
asset in a transaction not shielded from sections 1245 and 1250,
the original transferee must recognize as ordinary income the un-
taxed recapture potential created by the original transferor. 180 How
should this provision for the carryover of potential depreciation re-
capture affect the timing of section 111 income recognition? Argua-
bly, this provision requires tax benefit rule income recognition only
when the corporation-transferee subsequently disposes of the as-
sets that the shareholder expensed prior to the section 351 trans-
fer. Another issue this carryover provision raises is whether the tax
benefit rule income accrues to the corporation-transferee or to the
shareholder-transferor in such a section 351 transaction. The car-
ryover of depreciation recapture potential pursuant to sections
1245 and 1250181 suggests that the corporation should recognize
the section 111 income when it subsequently disposes of the trans-
ferred assets. As a result of these competing applications of section
111 to section 351 transfers, the ultimate questions that remained
unanswered after Nashl8 2 also survive Bliss Dairy.
D. Applications of Bliss Dairy to Transfers by Gift
Because the basic nonrecognition rules for transfers of previ-
ously expensed assets by gift and by bequest originated in the
courts, an application of Bliss Dairy to those situations cannot rest
upon statutes, regulations, or legislative histories. An analysis of
the relevant case law and indirectly related statutes, however, may
provide guidance for the application of the Bliss Dairy holding in
such factual settings.
As with the application of section 111 to section 351 transfers,
the application of section 111 to transfers by gift and by bequest
also requires the consideration of factors supporting a broad inter-
pretation of those nonrecognition provisions and other factors
favoring a narrower interpretation of those provisions. For exam-
180. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(2)(i) (1965); Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(c)(3) (1971).
181. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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ple, Campbell'8 3 and Evangelista8 4 support a nonrecognition rule
broad enough to preclude section 111 income recognition in a gift
context. By allowing the donor to recognize no gain on a gift of
appreciated property and to deduct the property's fair market
value as a charitable contribution, notwithstanding the prior de-
duction of the expenditures that sustained the appreciation,
Campbell arguably extends the nonrecognition rule specifically to
section 111. Likewise, the court's view in Evangelista-that the
classification of a transfer as a gift precludes all tax consequences
to the donor-obviously renders section 111 inoperative in such a
case."s5 Additionally, the exclusion of gifts generally from deprecia-
tion recapture rules suggests that section 111 does not apply to gift
transfers.186 Once again, however, the controlling nature of the re-
capture rules is far from clear. The Code requires no depreciation
recapture to the donor. The recapture potential, however, carries
over to the donee for recognition when the donee subsequently dis-
poses of the gift. 8 7 Under the Bliss Dairy analysis, does the depre-
ciation recapture scheme require that the donee recognize the tax
benefit rule income and that he recognize it only upon a subse-
quent disposal? As with the preceding analysis of sections 111 and
351, the answer depends upon the extent to which the depreciation
recapture rules control the application of section 111 in such gift
contexts.
In opposition to the evidence supporting the inapplicability of
section 111 in gift contexts, Levine18 8 signals a potential erosion of
the general Campbell rule of nonrecognition for all types of gain or
income resulting from gifts. The Levine interpretation obviously
invites application of tax benefit principles in the gift area. Like-
wise, the applicability of section 47(a)(1)'s investment tax credit
recapture rule in gift contexts contradicts the broad nonrecogni-
tion standard suggested by Campbell and Evangelista.89 Although
the investment tax credit affects the taxpayer's tax liability rather
183. See Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
184. See Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980).
185. See id. at 1221; supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
186. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(1), 1250(d)(1) (1982) (excluding gift transfers from the gen-
eral depreciation recapture provisions).
187. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(a)(4)(ii) (1965); Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(a)(3) (1971).
188. Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra notes
103-11 and accompanying text.
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(a)(1) (1967). This provision in conjunction with others
requires an addition to the taxpayer's income tax liability following the disposition by gift of
an asset for which the taxpayer previously received an investment tax credit.
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than his taxable income, the application of the credit recapture
rule to gift transactions refutes the argument that Congress and
the courts intended that gifts should produce no tax to the donor.
Finally, the assignment of income doctrine requires taxation of the
donor who gives the right to receive income as opposed to the do-
nor who gives the income producing property itself.190
E. Applications of Bliss Dairy to Transfers by Bequest
A similar mix of factors obscures the scope of the nonrecogni-
tion rule in cases of transfers of previously expensed assets by be-
quest. The general rules of nonrecognition that Revenue Ruling 73-
183, Suisman, and Kenan established, 191 the exception to the de-
preciation recapture rules, 92 and the statutory exclusion of the as-
signment of income doctrine from such transactions'9" generally
support the subordination of section 111 to the general nonrecogni-
tion provision. In opposition, the Suisman and Kenan excep-
tions'94 to nonrecognition in the event of a distribution of appreci-
ated property in satisfaction of a pecuniary legacy reflect a
narrower nonrecognition rule that permits full implementation of
the tax benefit rule. Indeed, the recognition of unrealized appreci-
ation under the Suisman and Kenan holdings provides strong sup-
190. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (holding that when the donor gives
the right to collect income, the donor is taxed as though he collected the income and subse-
quently transferred the proceeds). See supra note 55.
191. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F.
Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), afl'd per curiam, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
573 (1936); see supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
192. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(2), 1250(d)(2) (1982) (excluding transfers at death from the
general depreciation recapture provisions). This exception to the recapture rules, however,
extends only to cases in which the transferee determines his basis under § 1014(a). See id.
§§ 1001(a)-(c), 1014(a)-(b)(1); supra note 110 and accompanying text. As a result, the trans-
fer of specific property from the decedent to his estate and from the estate to a specific
legatee requires no depreciation recapture. A transfer of the property to a legatee in satis-
faction of a pecuniary bequest, however, does require recapture. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-
4(b) (1965); Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(b)(1) (1971). Does Bliss Dairy by analogy require tax
benefit rule recapture in cases in which the transfer of previously expensed assets satisfies a
pecuniary bequest?
193. I.R.C. § 691(a) (1982) (providing that rights to receive income transferred by be-
quest, devise, or inheritance are income to the distributee when he collects them). In Bliss
Dairy the Court relied upon the application of the assignment of income doctrine in § 336
cases as an indication that Congress intended to narrow § 336 nonrecognition. Section 691 in
essence negates the application of the assignment of income doctrine in cases of transfers at
death. Section 691 suggests a broader nonrecognition rule for death transfers than for § 336
liquidations.
194. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F.
Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935); supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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port for the recognition of tax benefit rule income in such transfer
at death cases because, under a multiple taxpayer construct, a
double deduction of the property's basis generally produces an ac-
tual realization or recovery.
Each of these multiple taxpayer construct cases produces sub-
stantial evidence supporting and opposing the implementation of
the tax benefit rule, notwithstanding the relevant nonrecognition
provisions. In Bliss Dairy, Congress' preoccupation with limiting
nonrecognition to appreciation gain, as opposed to tax benefit rule
income, apparently clinched the Court's decision to interpret nar-
rowly section 336 nonrecognition and section 337 nonrecognition.
The Court's logic also may support a narrow interpretation of the
nonrecognition rule for death transfers because that nonrecogni-
tion provision originally was established in response to uncertainty
regarding the taxation of appreciation gain or loss. 195 Because
Campbell, however, required no income recognition for even the
previously deducted costs of sustaining the appreciation of a
donated asset, which also supported a section 170 deduction, 19 6 an
exception to nonrecognition in gift transfers cannot rely upon a
limitation of the nonrecognition rule to appreciation income. The
result of this type of analysis-that section 111 overrides transfers
by nonrecognition bequests but not nonrecognition gifts-appears
entirely consistent with the basis rules applicable to such transfers.
Because donees receive a carryover basis 197 and legatees receive a
stepped-up basis,198 the broader nonrecognition in case of a gift
and the narrower nonrecognition in the case of a bequest seems
entirely appropriate. The outcome is also consistent with the Bliss
Dairy rule requiring section 111 recapture only when double de-
duction potential exists. 99
In summary, the two-tiered analysis of the Bliss Dairy major-
ity creates a very unworkable and unpredictable standard for ap-
195. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
196. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c) (1982);
see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
197. See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1982).
198. See id. § 1014(a).
199. Assume, for example, that prior to the transferor-decedent's death, he deducted
the costs of certain assets he used in a proprietorship. Upon his death, he transfers by will
the assets to his son, who receives a stepped-up basis and deducts that basis as part of his
own proprietorship operations. In this scenario, unlike the cases of gift transfers, the same
double deduction potential exists that weighed heavily in the Bliss Dairy majority's analy-
sis. 460 U.S. 370 (1983); see supra notes 126 & 147.
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plication of the tax benefit rule in nonrecognition settings. 00 The
first tier, which establishes the mechanical prerequisites for section
111 application, creates a standard so broad that all the multiple
taxpayer construct cases discussed above fall within the scope of
the post-Bliss Dairy tax benefit rule. The second tier, which de-
signs the format for determining whether section 111 overrides the
relevant nonrecognition provision, is so subjective and unpredict-
able that a court could rely on it to justify virtually any decision.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE
Bliss Dairy COURT
In at least one section 336 case, the IRS presented alternative
resolutions to the perceived double deduction problems-resolu-
tions that would achieve a result similar to Bliss Dairy's income
adjustment and also would avoid the distortion and redefinition of
the tax benefit rule that Bliss Dairy creates. In Commissioner v.
South Lake Farms, Inc. °1 the Commissioner, seeking to eliminate
the double deduction potential that resulted from a subsequent
step-up in basis and rededuction by the distributee,0 2 attempted
to use his section 482 powers to disallow the liquidating corpora-
tion's original deduction. The tax court rejected the Commis-
sioner's argument because of the distinction between "allocation"
and "disallowance" that the court established in Chicago & North
Western Railway v. Commissioner.0 3 Based upon this precedent,
the tax court held that section 482 permitted the Commissioner to
allocate items affecting a taxpayer's income or tax liability between
that taxpayer and another organization owned by the same inter-
ests, but did not permit him to disregard totally such items affect-
ing income or tax liability.20 4 The tax court's interpretation is a
proper reading of the regulations that describe the Commissioner's
authority in any case in which "the taxable income, . . . of a con-
trolled taxpayer, is other than it would have been had the taxpayer
• ..been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with
another uncontrolled taxpayer. ' 20 5 This interpretation is also a
200. Accord Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Income Tax Controver-
sies-Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, Inc., 61 TAXEs 363 (1983); Yin, supra note
147.
201. 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), af'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
202. Id. at 1040.
203. 29 T.C. 989 (1958).
204. 36 T.C. at 1042.
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1962).
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proper reading of the Code, which allows the Commissioner to
"distribute, apportion, or allocate" items affecting the income or
tax liability of commonly owned or controlled taxpayers.206 The in-
terpretation renders section 482 useless, however, in eliminating
the double deduction potential in a scenario similar to Bliss Dairy
because the Commissioner could shift only the deduction to an-
other taxpayer.
Alternatively, in South Lake Farms, Inc.2 °7 the Commissioner
attempted to disallow the liquidating corporation's original deduc-
tion under section 446(b), which permits the Secretary to require
recomputation of taxable income to reflect income clearly.20 8 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Commissioner's con-
tention °0 because the Commissioner had not presented a tax ac-
counting method that required the proposed addition to the tax-
payer's income and because the adjustment circumvented the
nonrecognition purpose of section 336 and the basis provision of
section 334.210 Further analysis of the regulations under section 446
and the Bliss Dairy interpretation of section 336 suggests that the
court's first justification for rejecting the Commissioner's section
446(b) argument is invalid. The regulations provide that "no
method of accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, it clearly reflects income."2'' The Commissioner's
full discretion to overrule the taxpayer's cash method, together
with the existence of the completed contract method or other
"practices" that may require no deduction in the year of expendi-
ture,1 2 support the Commissioner's authority to disallow the origi-
nal deduction in South Lake Farms, Inc. and Bliss Dairy. Addi-
tionally, the Bliss Dairy interpretation of section 336 invalidates
the South Lake Farms, Inc. court's second justification for re-
jecting the Commissioner's section 446(b) attack. The Supreme
Court's holding in Bliss Dairy-that section 336 nonrecognition
extended only to income from appreciation in asset value-surely
precludes the use of section 336 as a basis for rejecting a section
446(b) disallowance of an expense deduction.21 3 Based upon this
206. I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
207. 324 F.2d at 838-40.
208. I.R.C. ] 446](b) (1982).
209. But cf. Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970) (in which the
Ninth Circuit accepted this § 446(b) argument under similar facts).
210. 324 F.2d at 839.
211. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1957).
212. See 324 F.2d at 849-52 (Carter, J., dissenting).
213. See Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that
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analysis, the Bliss Dairy Court could have avoided redefining the
tax benefit rule by basing its income adjustment on section 446(b).
The Court's adoption of the section 446(b) argument, however,
which produces the same tax result as the application of section
111, fails to consider the manner of income recognition that would
best achieve the policy objectives behind the relevant nonrecogni-
tion provision. In applying sections 111, 446(b), or 482 in a case
like Bliss Dairy, the Court must choose between a full recapture or
no adjustment at all. This all or nothing approach contrasts
sharply with Congress' reaction to a similar problem in the section
118 area-a shareholder-employee's cancellation of an accrued sal-
ary obligation that his corporation owes him.2 14 In that situation,
while avoiding any reference to section 111, Congress decided that
the corporation should not receive the benefit of the prior deduc-
tion. Congress, however, considered the policy behind sections 108
and 118 and allowed the taxpayer to spread the adjustment to in-
come over time by adjusting the basis of depreciable assets.215 Con-
sidering the fact that the other transactions discussed in this Note
initially merited nonrecognition status, such a flexible income rec-
ognition scheme would complement most appropriately the policy
considerations in those contexts as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bliss Dairy analysis creates a very unworkable standard
for application of the tax benefit rule in nonrecognition settings.
The Court should have allowed the taxpayer the benefits provided
by the stepped-up basis provisions of the Code, even if those provi-
sions produced double tax benefit potential. At the very least, the
Court should have used section 446(b) to achieve the same result
in Bliss Dairy without changing the basic nature and function of
the tax benefit rule. Regardless of the Court's response, this con-
flict between section 111 and the various nonrecognition provisions
requires congressional action. Congress should mandate the inap-
plicability of the tax benefit rule to various nonrecognition provi-
§ 337(a), which the Bliss Dairy Court interpreted as requiring the same tax treatment as
§ 336(a), yields to § 446(b)); see also Note, supra note 56, at 731-32 (supporting the use of
§ 446 and § 482 rather than § 111).
214. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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sions such as those discussed in this Note, and additionally should
provide a method of income recognition that complements the pol-
icy considerations behind those nonrecognition rules.
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